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Abstract
This study aims to know the influence of company disclosure after the regulation
of Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Number 7 Year 2012 and Regulation of
Minister of Finance Number 75/PMK.011/2012 in Indonesian mining companies. The
data used in this study come from mining companies listed on the BEI 2010–2014
with a total of 184 mining companies. The analysis technique used is the method
of multiple linear regression analysis with the help of software STATA 14.0. Our first
prediction is that firms with better governance mechanism will have higher level
of disclosure. Regression results indicate that after the government regulations on
mining companies, corporate governance practices and ownership structures have no
effect on the level disclosure of mining companies in Indonesia.
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1. Introduction
Environmental, social and corporate governance are important and integral aspects
of company performance. However, the literature about the impact of corporate gov-
ernance aspects on sustainability disclosure is still relatively small and, so far, it is
focused primarily on developed countries (Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Developing
countries markets have a tendency to show weak corporate governance and sustain-
ability (Lenssen et al., 2011).
Disclosure of financial statements becomes important to be a measure of the share-
holders’ trust in the company. Gunawan et al. (2009) examine corporate disclosures in
the company’s annual report listed on the Indonesian stock exchange over the 2003-
2006 period and found that companies in sensitive industrial environments, such as
mining, tend to disclose more environmental information than other industries.
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In Agency Theory, it is explained that it is difficult to trust that management (agent)
will always act in the interests of the principals, so that it requires supervision from
the shareholders (principal). Agency conflicts arise because people tend to be self-
centered, so then it generates conflict as some interests have to be met. The existence
of this agency conflict can, of course, lead to agency cost. Ashbaugh, Collins, and
Lafond (2009) find that agency costs can also occur due to information asymmetry
because shareholders cannot observe manager behavior directly. So, to reduce the
asymmetric information between management and shareholders, the company must
increase its openness (Lang & Lundholm, 1993)
This is in connectionwith the Regulation ofMinister of Energy andMineral Resources
Number 7 Year 2012 and Regulation of the Minister of Finance Number 75 / PMK.011
/ 2012 concerning the increase of added value of minerals and the determination of
exported goods subject to the export duty tariff, whose content prohibits the export of
raw materials or minerals before it has been first processed. So, the mining company
must do the processing before it is exported. In the processing activities, the company
must issue additional costs, labor and capital from investors to support operational
activities before goods are ready to export. The activity involves investors, so the
company must show the credibility of financial statements and the quality of financial
information to convince them. In this case, the company can perform disclosure to
reduce the information asymmetry that creates agency problem.
Improving corporate disclosure requires good corporate governance to supervise
and monitor. Corporate governance can also provide control benefits to board of direc-
tors, commissioners, audit committees and ownership structures. In the case of the
ownership structure, the study measures the percentage ownership of shares owned
by parties other than management (commissioners and directors) whose ownership
is above five percent of the total shares, which is as ownership of blockholders.
Previous research has generally focused on examining the influence of ownership
structure on firm value or firm performance (Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 2002;
Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Thomsen, Pedersen, & Kvist, 2006), but empirical stud-
ies investigating influences of ownership structure on corporate disclosure in emerging
markets is relatively rare, especially in Indonesia. One previous study investigating the
influence of ownership structure on corporate disclosures considers the possibility of
non-linear relationships between ownership structure and corporate disclosure (Chau
& Gray, 2010). The study found that firms tend to be reluctant to disclose information
if this behavior jeopardizes their competitive position in the industry (Darrough &
Stoughton, 1990; Dye, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). This research is expected to provide
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benefits or information for investors to invest in mining companies after the emer-
gence of ministerial regulations of ESDM in Indonesia.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis
Disclosure is defined as providing the amount of information required for optimal oper-
ation of efficient capital markets (Suhardjanto & Wardhani, 2010). Annual report is a
medium for companies to convey company information in the form of financial condi-
tion and other information to shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders. According
to Suhardjanto andWardhani (2010), the information disclosed in the annual report can
be grouped into two, namely mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure.
Agency theory relates to the agency conflict that arises when the objectives of the
principal and the agent are actually different, where the principal has difficulty to verify
what the agent actually does. This happens because principals and agents have dif-
ferent risk preferences, so they choose different actions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Managers
may act against the interests of the lender. The lender will anticipate this behavior by
raising the interest rate on the loan. As a result, managers have an incentive to not act
against the interest of the lender, by entering into the terms of the agreement under
which the manager agrees to limit the additional loan when it is outstanding (Scott,
2012).
To reduce the asymmetric information betweenmanagement and shareholders, the
company must increase its openness. Disclosure may be provided through manda-
tory disclosure and voluntary disclosure (both financial and non-financial information).
Companies should take the initiative to disclose matters other than required in legis-
lation, but which can assist the decision-making process by stakeholders ( Juniarti &
Sentosa, 2010).
In increasing disclosure to reduce agency problem, good corporate governance is
required in this case in which there can be a supervising and monitoring system.
Corporate governance is a process and structure applied in running a companywith the
main objective to increase shareholder value in the long term by still paying attention
to the interests of other stakeholders.
Disclosure is also closely related to the ownership structure in order to reduce
agency conflict. The ownership structure is divided into managerial ownership, block-
holder ownership and government ownership. Based on these studies, lowmanagerial
ownership and significant government ownership can increase voluntary disclosure.
This study takes ownership of blockholders, because blockholder ownership is a
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shareholder whose ownership is at least 5% of the company’s shares. Juniarti and
Sentosa (2010) argue that potential shareholders are expected to have greater power
in monitoring management, because their performance is closely related to the com-
pany’s financial performance. This opinion is supported by Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb
(2003), Chau and Gray (2010) and Lenssen et al. (2011).
The effectiveness of Corporate Governance is determined by how the Corporate
Governance mechanism works within the company (Utami, Suhardjanto, & Hartoko,
2012) as well as any corporate governance structure. But if the mechanism or process
is not working properly, the ultimate goal of protecting the interests of shareholders
and stakeholders will never be achieved (Eng & Mak, 2003). In this case, the company
must also understand the existence of agency theory in the interest of the agent with
the principal, so that it takes the practice of Corporate Governance to supervise and
monitor the activities of the agent as the company management of the principal.
Corporate governance itself can also provide control benefits for boards of direc-
tors, boards of commissioners, audit committees, ownership structures and financial
disclosures. Therefore, corporate governance practices in the research use assessment
of aspects such as boards of commissioners, boards of directors, audit committees and
independent commissioners (Harford et al., 2012). Therefore, the authors assume that:
The audit committee is one of the committees established by the board of com-
missioners as one of the additional organs required in the implementation of good
corporate governance principles. Audit committees arise as a result of supervisory role
and the board of commissioners are generally inadequate. The importance of the audit
committee in an open company is corroborated by Circular Letter of the Chairman of
Bapepam no. Se-03 / PM / 2000 about the Audit Committee. This provision requires
any public company or issuer to have an audit committee (Major, 2012).
Hypothesis 1: Audit committee size has a positive association on disclosure level
In a two-tier system, the roles of the board of commissioners and the board of
directors are clearly separated. The board of commissioners will oversee the execution
of the work performed by the board of directors. In a two-tier system, it is very
clear that there is a difference between the function of taking and implementing the
policy with the supervisory function. The decision-making function and its execution
are carried out by the board of directors, while the oversight function of the policies
carried out by the board of directors is done by the board of commissioners. In carrying
out its vast duties, the board of commissioners may establish various committees to
assist it to function more effectively. Utama (2012) states that there are two types
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of council committees. The first type is a committee that plays an important role in
providing input to management and the board of commissioners on business decision-
making that is important to the company, for example the strategic planning commit-
tee. The second type deals with monitoring or oversight functions of the board, such
as audit committees, remuneration committees and nomination committees. These
committees can specifically enhance the accountability of the board as they provide
independent oversight of the various activities of the boards.
Hypothesis 2: Board size has a positive association on disclosure level
Companies tend to respond to the regulation in a positive way to increase their com-
pliance to the regulation as well as to increase their reputation. In general, we expect
that, after the implementation of the new regulation, the companies will increase their
disclosure level in their annual report. The formal hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3: Mining companies will have higher level of disclosure following
new regulation imposed.
3. Research Methodology
The population and samples in the study are mining companies listed on the IDX in the
period 2010-2015. This includes all financial data and annual reports. The total sample
in this research is 184 mining companies.
3.1. Variable of disclosure
The data processing is done in two stages. The first stage is in the form of scoring on
the disclosure of items in the annual report as conducted by Botosan (1997), while the
second stage is testing the hypotheses.
3.2. Variable of corporate governance practice
In determining the Corporate Governance Practices there are two ways of analysis in
entering the formula, as follows:
1. BOARDSIZE = BD + BC
BOARDSIZE is an analysis of Corporate Governance Practices which is the sum total
of board of directors (BD) and board of commissioners (BC) of a company.
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2. AUDITSIZE =∑AUDITCOMMITTEE
AUDITSIZE is an analysis of Corporate Governance Practices which is the sum total
of the company’s audit committee.
3.3. Variable of ownership structure
The next independent variable is the Ownership Structure, which is proxied by the
large percentage of the ownership shareholders (blockholder). According to Eng and
Mak (2003) and Thomsen et al. (2006), ownership of blockholders is the proportion of
ordinary shares held by major shareholders (i.e. 5% or more of share ownership). A
higher percentage of large shareholders shows more concentrated ownership.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics provide information about the general description of the variables
that will be tested. Concerning the description of the variables used in the study,
DISCLOSURE, corporate governance practices (to be proffered through BOARDSIZE and
AUDITSIZE), the proxy ownership structure goes through BLOCKHOLDER, FIRMSIZE, LEVERAGE
and ROA. These descriptive statistics provide information on theminimum values, max-
imum values and mean (mean) values of each research variable. Descriptive statistics
in this study can be seen in the following table:
T 1: Descriptive Analysis.
Variables Mean Median Minimum Maximum
DISCLOSURE 0.625 0.600 0.486 0.829
BOARDSIZE 9.114 9.000 4.000 15.000
AUDITSIZE 3.071 3.000 2.000 5.000
BLOCKHOLDER 1.033 0.897 -0.875 3.476
FIRMSIZE 14.845 15.139 9.085 18.230
ROA 4.996 1.705 -22.000 49.910
LEVERAGE 0.616 0.740 -39.990 17.750
Table 1 above shows the results of descriptive statistics of research variables from
observation year 2010 to 2014, each variable amounted to 184 companies engaged in
mining.
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T 2: Pearson Correlation.
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
[1] DSCORE 1.000
[2] BOARDSIZE 0.256∗∗∗ 1.000
(0.000)
[3] AUDITSIZE 0.173∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 1.000
(0.019) (0.020)
[4] BLOCKHOLDER -0.031 0.074 -0.017 1.000
(0.678) (0.317) (0.822)
[5] FIRMSIZE 0.176∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.071 -0.245∗∗∗ 1.000
(0.017) (0.000) (0.340) (0.001)
[6] ROA 0.022 0.223∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗ -0.012 0.189∗∗∗ 1.000
(0.765) (0.002) (0.032) (0.868) (0.010)
[7] LEV 0.008 -0.122∗ 0.004 -0.236∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.036 1.000
(0.914) (0.099) (0.960) (0.001) (0.001) (0.624)
Pearson correlation test is a test that measures the dependence and direction of the
linear relationship between two random variables (real-valued vector) (Zhou et al.,
2016).
4.2. Regression analysis
This study performs an empirical analysis to assess the effect of disclosure on corpo-
rate governance practice and ownership structure in mining companies listed on the
Indonesian stock exchange from 2010 to 2014. This study uses Ordinary Least Square
(OLS) regression model using STATA / MP 14.0 for doing regression analysis.
4.2.1. The influence of disclosure on corporate governance practice and
the company’s ownership structure
The following is the regression equation compiled by the author:
DISCLOSURE = α + β1.BOARDSIZE + β2.ACSIZE + β3.BLOCK + β4.SIZE + β5.SIZE +
β6.ROA + β7.LEV + e
The results in Table 3 show that BOARDSIZE and AUDITSIZE as proxies of Corporate
Governance have a positive significant influence on disclosure (DISCLOSURE). This is
in accordance with the statement of Hartoko et al. (2012) where, in a company, to
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T 3: Regression Analysis.
Variables Predicted Sign DISCLOSURE
(1) (2)
BOARDSIZE + 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(2.68) (3.16)
AUDITSIZE + 0.021∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(1.89) (2.68)
BLOCKHOLDER - -0.002 -0.002
(-0.27) (-0.33)
SIZE + 0.004 0.004
(1.18) (1.15)
ROA - -0.000 -0.000
(-0.89) (-0.98)




Year Dummies Included Included
Industries Dummies Included Included
Number of Observations 184 184
R-Squared 0.098 0.098
Adjusted R-Squared 0.045 0.045
F 1.872 2.113
improve a good corporate disclosure requires good corporate governance and con-
duct supervision and control of the board of directors, board of commissioners, audit
committee, ownership structure, and financial disclosure.
However, BLOCKHOLDER as a proxy of the ownership structure has no significant
effect on disclosures, which is in accordance with the results of Chau and Gray (2010),
which also find non-linear relationships between corporate disclosure and blockholder
ownership. So, in this case, the ownership structure has no effect on many of the least
disclosures made by the company.
DISCLOSURE = α + β1.BOARDSIZE x AFTER + β2.ACSIZE x AFTER +
β3.BOARDSIZE + β4.AFTER + β5.BLOCK + β6.ACSIZE +
β7.FIRMSIZE + β8.ROA + β9.LEV + e
The results in Table 4 show the regression result from post implementation of Reg-
ulation of Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Number 7 of 2012 and Regulation
of the Minister of Finance Number 75 / PMK.011 / 2012, whereby the proxy corporate
governance post the emergence of rules represented by BOARDSIZE x AFTER and
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T 4: Regression Analysis Post Emergence of Regulations related to Mining Companies.
Variable Predicted Sign DISCLOSURE
(1) (2) (3)
BOARDSIZE x AFTER - -0.000 0.000
(-0.10) (0.06)
AUDITSIZE x AFTER - -0.017 -0.017
(-0.91) (-0.90)
AFTER + 0.005 0.052 0.050
(0.12) (0.88) (0.79)
BOARDSIZE + 0.006∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.006
(1.83) (2.47) (1.60)
AUDITSIZE + 0.024∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(2.57) (2.32) (2.25)
BLOCKHOLDER - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.16) (-0.19) (-0.18)
FIRMSIZE + 0.005 0.005 0.005
(1.24) (1.30) (1.30)
ROA - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.53) (-1.52) (-1.54)
LEV - -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.37) (-0.44) (-0.44)
CONSTANT 0.425∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗
(6.17) (5.13) (5.12)
Number of Observation 146 146 146
R-Squared 0.101 0.104 0.104
Year dummies Included Included Included
Industries Dummies Included Included Included
R-Squared _a 0.035 0.038 0.031
F 1.776 1.750 1.628
AUDITSIZE x AFTER has no significant effect on disclosure (DISCLOSURE). Regulation
of the ESDM minister and finance minister whose content prohibits the exporting of
raw materials or mineral seeds before being processed in advance causes mining
companies to process before they are exported and the processing activities of the
companymust incur additional costs, labor and capital from investors for support oper-
ational activities before goods are ready for export. When agents feel this information
jeopardizes their competitive position in the marketplace, they will tend not to disclose
the information (Darrough & Stoughton, 1990; Dye, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001).
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5. Conclusions
Based on the test results that have been obtained and the discussion that has been
explained in the previous chapter, several things can be concluded, as follows. Prior
to the adoption of the ministerial rules about the audit committee, whether or not it
has many, it may at least influence the extent of the disclosures of firms by providing
oversight to company managers, which means Hypothesis 1a is accepted, while post-
implementation of ministerial regulation about whether, at least, audit committee has
no effect on the disclosure of a company. The size of the board is the sum of the
board of commissioners and the board of directors. Prior to the emergence of the
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Regulation No. 7 Year 2012 and Regulation
of the Minister of Finance No. 75 / PMK.011 / 2012, the size of the board has a sig-
nificant influence on disclosure, which means Hypothesis 1b is accepted. However,
the regulatory readings indicate that the size of the board no longer has an effect
on corporate disclosure. Before the Regulation of the Minister of Energy and Mineral
Resources Number 7 Year 2012 and Regulation of the Minister of Finance Number 75
/ PMK.011 / 2012, many of the ownership structures had no significant effect on the
mining company disclosure activities, which means Hypothesis 2 is rejected. This is
consistent with the findings by Chau and Gray (2010) who found a non-linear relation-
ship between corporate disclosure and blockholder ownership.
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